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Second Marriage after Divorce does not come under the definition of Domestic Violence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Abuse Act, 2005.

In an appeal filed before the Bombay High Court to quash proceedings under Protection of Women from Domestic Abuse Act, 2005 in the subordinate judiciary, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the said proceedings and other related proceedings, on the ground that second marriage after a valid divorce cannot be taken as a cause of action for Domestic violence.

The facts of the case are pertinent to the conclusion drawn by the Court. The facts are that the Appellant and the Respondent got married in 2011 but due to discord in the relations filed for divorce in the Family Court a few years later. The divorce was granted to the Appellant on the ground of cruelty towards him. Moreover, an application for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the Respondent was denied in the impugned judgement. 

This order was challenged before the High Court and the Supreme Court, all of which upheld the divorce. The Special Leave Petition filed by the Respondent were denied in the Supreme Court.

After dismissal the Respondent filed a case under Section 12 to 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Abuse Act, 2005 with allegations similar to those made in the proceedings pertaining to the divorce decree and the application for restitution of conjugal rights. She claimed that the Appellant had performed cruelty by solemnizing a second marriage. The Respondent therein demanded monthly maintenance, compensation, residence order and other monetary relief.

The Appellant approached the High Court praying for quashing of the proceedings in the Family Court. The Court thereafter stayed the proceedings until further orders. The Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the proceedings initiated by the Respondent were untenable since same facts and incidents that were referred to and relied upon in the earlier set of proceedings pertaining to the divorce decree and rejection of the application for restitution of conjugal rights, were relied upon in the said application. It was also submitted that performing a second marriage could not be an incident for which the respondent could invoke provisions of the D.V. Act.  

The Court held that contentions alleged by the respondent had been considered and decided by the Family Court and that the findings had attained finality up to the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Respondent cannot be permitted to reiterate the same by filing application under the provisions of the D.V. Act, three months after the Supreme Court dismissed her Special Leave Petition.

The Court further held that Section 3 of the D.V. Act defines ‘domestic violence’ in an elaborate manner and it refers to physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse, and economic abuse. It is in the context of a domestic relationship shared between the aggrieved person and the respondent. Merely because the Applicant performed a second marriage cannot come within the definition of Domestic Violence.

Thereby appeal was allowed.

Karvy Wealth faces challenge in Delhi High Court for fraudulent activities.

On 13th August, 2021 clients of Karvy Private Wealth, a wealth management company, filed a case against it under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code on the ground that the Company did not provide restitution to financial creditors in cases where the corporate debtor raised money through fraudulent schemes. The clients were promised assured returns and buyback schemes. The investment received from schemes had in turn been disbursed to builders in different parts of the country who defaulted in their payments.

The clients have filed a number of cases against Karvy in different forums including the Supreme Court, Delhi High Court, National Company Law Tribunal, Delhi and National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh. The cases have been filed not only against Karvy Private Wealth but also against the different builder companies which had taken the investments from Karvy and had defaulted on the payments to the clients. 

In the instant case, the petition has been filed against the resolution process of C and C Towers Pvt. Ltd. (Herein after “Company”), a builder developing a Bus Terminal in Mohali, Punjab. The builder had taken funds from the Karvy Private Wealth for completion of the project and had offered buyback schemes and promised assured returns. Karvy Realty Ltd, a part of the parent company Karvy Stock Broking, hid essential information from the clients while marketing the Company for investment. It hid the fact that the project was severely delayed and that accounts of the Company have been declared NPA.

The Company was unable to fulfil its promise and defaulted on its payment. Thereafter, the Company went into insolvency proceedings. The Resolution Plan accepted by the CoC proposed an 87% cut to the creditors. The retail investors categorically rejected the aforementioned resolution plan but since they were in a minority, Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company with 60% voting share was able to approve it to the detriment of the investors.

Apart from the specific instances of Karvy and its builder clients, the petitioners have also challenged various provisions of laws related to investor rights. The petitioners had first challenged the -minimum 10% requirement from a class of investors for initiating insolvency proceedings- which was introduced through an amendment in the IBC. The Supreme Court however ruled against them and upheld the amendment. 

The petition filed against Karvy also challenges provision of the Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act, 2020 for providing a savings clause in favour of IBC and SARFASI Act under Clause 12 of the impugned Act. The petition further prays for the Court to fill the lacuna in the IBC relating to the redress the grievances of individual retail investors who have been fraudulently lured into investing in Ponzi schemes by declaring it violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Rajasthan High Court upholds grant of maternity relied to woman who gave birth prior to joining of the service.

On 4th August, 2021, the High Court of Rajasthan passed judgement in State of Rajasthan v Neeraj, wherein a single judge’s decision of granting maternity leave to a woman who gave birth prior to joining the service was upheld.

The facts of the case are that the respondent-petitioner gave birth to a child almost a month prior to her receiving the appointment letter. Subsequently she applied for a maternity leave. The request for her maternity leave was decided after 2 years. After a case was brought before a single bench of the Rajasthan High Court, the Judge held the woman to be entitled to the maternity relied. The same was challenged before the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court. 

The Division Bench consisting of Hon’ble Chief Justice Indrajit Mahanty and Hon’ble Justice Vinit Kumar Mathur heard the matter. 

The Additional Advocate General argued that the benefits of maternity leave are not available to the respondent because the delivery happened before commission of the job. Under Rule 103 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 a female servant is entitled for maternity leave only if she is in service. In the present case she was not a part of the service on the date she delivered the baby.

The Counsel for the respondent submitted that it is a beneficial legislation and the fact that the respondent joined only 19 days after the delivery of the baby does not deny her the benefit of the maternity leave.

The Court agreed with the view of Kerala High Court in the case of Mini KT v Senior Divisional Manager, LIC wherein the single Judge discussed the importance of motherhood, role of mothers and their position in the Indian society. The case also stated that “If on any reason she could not attend her workplace due to her duties towards child (compelling circumstances), the employer has to protect her person-hood as ‘mother’

The Court rejected the reasoning of the Counsel for the petitioner on the ground that Rule 103 has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the legislature which is facilitating a woman to overcome the problems and issues at the time of the delivery. Therefore, if a woman delivers a child before joining the services but within the confinement period, she would be entitled to maternity relief.

Therefore the Court upheld the decision of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal.

Supreme Court issues notice in a plea seeking grants from the PM Cares Fund for a medical treatment.

In a case filed before the Supreme Court of India, a wife sought relief from the Court to direct transfer of funds from PM Cares Fund and State CM’s Fund. The plea stated “Not providing necessary financial assistance to save life of the husband of Petitioner is violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and the same can be construed as inaction on the part of the State in providing adequate healthcare to the citizens, particularly during the prevailing Covid 19 situation.

The facts of the case are that Sheela Mehra sought financial assistance/grant from the PM Cares Fund and State CM Fund for a lung transplant for her husband after having exhausted her own savings on the Covid treatment of the husband. The husband was taken to AIIMS Bhopal but due to unavailability of ECMO machine, he was airlifted and then admitted to KIMS Hospital, Secundarabad, Telangana.

The petitioner stated that she personally visited the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) with an application for grant for defraying medical expenses of her husband. But the same was rejected as she did not have a recommendation from the Member of Parliament (MoP) of her constituency. According to the staff at the PMO, a recommendation letter was mandatory for processing the document.

The matter was brought before a Division Bench of Justice LN Rao and Justice Aniruddha Bose. They orally remarked that although nothing could be done for the petitioner in the Court, they still issued a notice to see if something could be done from the Union’s end. The Court subsequently issued notice to KIMS Hospital.

The petitioner argued that she was entitled to the relief sought on the basis of equity, justice and good conscience. She had a legitimate expectation from the Government. In the case of Parmanand Katara v UOI, the Court held that it is the obligation of the State to preserve life. In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v State of WB, it was held had denial of medical treatment to patient in a government Hospital for non- availability of bed is violative of Article 21. In the present case ECMO machine was not available at AIIMS, Bhopal.

Reliance was also placed on Centre for Public Interest Litigation v UOI, wherein it was held that the primary objective of dealing with any kind of emergency or distress situation, like posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and to provide relief to the affected.

The matter has been deferred to a further date.


In this case a wife sought relief from the Court to direct transfer of funds from PM Cares Fund and State CM’s Fund. She sought financial assistance/grant from the PM Cares Fund and State CM Fund for a lung transplant for her husband after having exhausted her own savings on the Covid treatment of the husband. The Division Bench orally remarked that although nothing could be done for the petitioner in the Court, they still issued a notice to see if something could be done from the Union’s end subsequently issued notice to KIMS Hospital. The matter has been deferred to a further date.

Offences against Religion Ss. 295-298

Offences against religion are described in section 295-298 on one principle that is “That every person should be allowed to profess his own religion and that no man should insult the religion of another.”

There are five provisions of the Indian penal code which deal with offences relating to religion.

  1. Section 295- Damaging or defiling, destroying any place of worship, or any object( not animate object it refers inanimate object like churches, temples or any stone marble which represent god)  held sacred by any class of persons, with intent to insult the religion of any class of person. Person is punishable with imprisonment of two years or fine or both.
  2. Section 295A – Deliberately or maliciously hurt the religious feeling of any class of citizens of India by words, by spoken or written or by signs or by  any visible marks, or otherwise insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of that class. Punishment for this offence is imprisonment for three years or fine or both.
  3. Section 296 – voluntarily causing disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship or ceremony. The person for this offence is punishable for imprisonment for one year or fine or both.

In one case, it has been held that if cows flesh is openly carried around a village in an uncovered state, with the intention of hurting the feelings of the Hindus of that village, it would be an offence [Rahaman, (1893) 13 AWN 144]

  1. Section 297 – trespassing in a place of worship or any burial place or offering any indignity to a corpse, or disturbing a person performing funeral ceremonies with intent to insult the religion or hurt the sentiments of any person or with the knowledge that the feelings of any person are likely to be wounded.
  2. Section 298 – uttering any word or making any weird sound, in the hearing of any person, or making any gesture or placing any object in the sight of any person deliberately wounding his religious feelings. Intention must be deliberate. Intention may be come with acts or words.

In one case The Allahabad High Court gives judgment certain Hindus present at a caster dinner were parking of the food, when other members of the caste came and told them to move to another place. When they refused to do so, a shoe was thrown at those who were eating. The court held that the person who threw the shoe was not guilty under section 298 of the code.


Khushwant Nimbark, Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law


Discerning the interface between Corporate Governance and Ease of Doing Business unveils the fact that there has been a dearth of research insights on the correlation between the two. Nevertheless, the very fact that good corporate governance is a desideratum for economic growth and apart from providing a more congenial environment for investment, it also creates opportunities for promoting free-market practices, fairness and rule of law; underscores the mutuality between the two. A sound corporate governance system provides for a set of rules that not only offers a congenial legal framework but also facilitates the simplification of procedures and pacing up the decision-making process for the ease of doing business, thus ushering in, a healthy environment for investment and growth of the corporate sector. In fact, the notion that good governance is essential for a propitious business environment emanates from the proposition that an economy that undergoes a moderate level of bureaucratic controls, witnesses greater compliance to the legislative framework and provides for an effective mechanism to curb evils like corruption, always proffers a sound business environment. All such regulations that define corporate governance must essentially be efficient, transparent and easy to implement so that they help the businesses to flourish.

On the other hand, the very idea of the concept of Ease of Doing Business subsumes in itself the dimension of the regulatory framework that governs the corporate sector. Perhaps this is why the principle of doing business is founded on the premise that business activity always benefits from the rules and ordinances that can potentially generate an environment that further stimulates new entrants and also creates prospects for greater innovation, expansion and productive growth.


Since 2006, the World Bank has been publishing data of various countries across the globe, ranked on the Ease of Doing Business index. In fact, the surveys conducted by the World Bank, while publishing the data, have also revealed that the economies with higher ranks in ease of doing business are not the ones with absolutely no regulatory framework, but those where the governments have created rules to facilitate market interactions, without unduly hampering the private capitalist regime. The growing interest of the policymakers and academicians across the world, in the issue of corporate governance, has contributed to the burgeoning of various dimensions of the concept of corporate governance. However, amongst the key components to the term, the ‘regulatory burden’ indicator which is identified as one of the parameters defining corporate governance, is conceived to examine the effect of the policies like price control measures, the inadequacy of banking regulations or intemperate regulatory control, which may otherwise be construed as being market-unfriendly and non-conducive to the growth of business in an economy. Thus, the interplay of the concept of ease of doing business with corporate governance is palpable even at the genesis of the idea of corporate governance.

It can be conveniently surmised that of all the components used for defining corporate governance, the most influential factors that exercise their effect on the ease of doing business are the ones that relate to the capacity of the government for contriving policy framework and ensuring its implementation. Some research findings have even been built upon the premise that the indicators of corporate governance are positively correlated to the business environment, even if the extent of the correlation differs between the low income and high-income countries[i]. Factors like ‘government effectiveness’ which are indicative of the ability of the government to formulate and implement an effectual policy framework and productively deliver public goods and services are one of the most potent governance factors influencing the ease of doing business in an economy. Furthermore, even the ‘quality of the regulatory framework’ goes a long way in implicating the extent of competition infused into the business environment and potentially strengthening the financial institutions so as to aid them in contributing towards prosperous businesses in the country[ii]. Another aspect included in the parameters defining corporate governance is the extent to which a state can effectively exercise ‘control over corruption’ and research findings substantiate that abuse of the public sector for private benefit can potentially harm the prospects of business development[iii].


The history of the Indian corporate sector succours the fact that the instances of corporate governance failure like the Satyam Computer Services, DHFL, Jet Airways, etc. exhort for the corporate sector to look into the best global practices of governance and adapt them appropriately to the Indian regime. That is why in line with keeping up with the requirements of corporate governance for promoting the ease of doing business in India, the government of India has been instituting reforms to improve the regulatory environment so as to achieve the twin objective of good governance and also inducing better business environment. Amongst these measures, the pre-eminent measures include reduction of tax burden on the corporate sector, especially aided by the induction of the Goods and Services Tax regime which provides clearance to 72 amendments to the Companies Act, 2013 which paves way for the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 and also decriminalises the compoundable and non-compoundable offences under the Companies Act, 2013. Each year, the World Bank publishes data on the Ease of Doing business rank prepared on the basis of a survey of various countries and this ranking is based upon the transparency of the ground rules, promotion of markets and revving up the market enterprises, boosting the development delivery mechanism and subsequently changing the perception and investment sentiments for the economy.  Perceivably, India has been able to perform better on the Ease of Doing Business Index in 2020 and its position improved by 14 places to secure the 63rd rank amongst the 190 countries surveyed this year, yet there is ample room for more improvement. A deeper analysis of the ranking report reveals that India has performed poorly (136th rank in 2020 from 137th in 2019) on the parameter of starting a business and that is where India needs a spur so as to attract more savings and investments from across the globe. Pacing up on the ladder of making business more easily doable in the economy, calls for revamping of the business climate and requires multifarious sets of ameliorations. An era of reforms needs to be initiated which can strengthen the climate for business investment and attract more capital from even across the borders. A major issue that inhibits a congenial economic ethos is the scum of bureaucratic controls and the consequent phenomenon of corruption, which has bred into the Indian system and got integrated with the officialdom for years together. Such a setup of work regime needs to be changed and transparency has to be induced in the air that blows across from the political front to the business environment so that the resourceful section does not grow at the expense of infringing the rights of the weaker. There is also a dire need to abolish the mechanism of complex and irrelevant documentation attached to the initiation of business enterprises. Such excessive control by the government only impedes the business growth prospects and a complete shift from documentation to the online mode of application can help to reduce the undesirable state intervention and also encourage the businesses which are at the verge of a tipping point and can contribute significantly to the economy. Apart from the measures required to reduce the procedural lapses, reforms are needed on the legal aspect as well. The time taken by the Courts in India for deciding matters is usually so long that the delays further culminate into deterrents and circumstances that obturate the business activity. This calls for speedy action on the part of the judiciary which can be achieved with the help of additional manpower and the use of digital technology to expedite the process of pronouncing decisions. If the Courts work at a snail’s pace, business would not grow. With regards to fulfilling the credit needs of the business, the banks too need to take a boost so that the time lag that elapses between sanction of loans and receipt of money be reduced before it adversely reflects upon the zeal or enthusiasm of the business proprietors. The present era is an age of technology and internet, and the quasi-deprived sectors like the MSME sector enterprises can be provided access to resources and also to the policy benefits of the government through the use of the contemporary technology facilities like labour, power, legal guidance, access to infrastructure can be arranged using the powerful tool of internet of things, which can go a long way in not only luring local but foreign investors too. The industrial potential of an economy like ours rests in its labour and to capitalise on the strength of our labour, efforts are required to train, educate and empower the labour and also incentivise them using lucrative wage rates so as to enable them to be able to contribute to various sectors of production.


Conclusively, the policymakers and the state authority need to reasonably frame policies in coordination and consultation with the business community. No business environment can flourish under despotism. The ease of doing business can only be enhanced with a pro-active policy approach. Since in the realm of contemporary reforms, the issue of ease of doing business does not confine itself to the private sector alone but also holds equal relevance for the public sector, given the increasing prospects of partnership and growing dichotomy between the two, therefore the present-day governments ought to work out a separate regulatory regime which aims at promoting the ease of doing business and contributes significantly to the development of a better and a healthier business environment.

[i] Cristina Bota-Avram, (2014), Good Governance and Doing Business: Evidence from a Cross Country Survey, Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, No.10, pp. 27 – 45.

[ii] Gani, A. and Duncan R., (2007), Measuring Good Governance Using Time Series Data: Fiji Islands, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 367-385

[iii] Weder B.,(1997) Corruption and the Rate of Temptations: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?, IMF Working Paper No. WP/97/73, available at, last accessed on 19.04.21

The Delhi H.C held that there is no distinction between part-time and full-time employee under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 2009

The High Court of Delhi in a recent judgement adjudged that even part- time, ad- hoc employees are entitled to gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009. The Bench consisted of Justice V. Kamesvar Rao.

The petition was filed by Janardhan Sharma, a part-time vocational teacher employed by the GNCT of Delhi. He prayed for the implementation of the Payment of Gratuity (Amendment) Act, 2009 with retrospective effect to extend the benefit of the scheme to vocational employees.

The facts of the case were that the Government of Delhi had introduced vocational training for 12th standard students. The Government had framed Recruitment Rules for the posts of Post Graduate Teachers (Vocational) in various Vocational Courses. In the year 2009, the Parliament amended the definition of the word ‘employee’ as defined in Section 2(e) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 with retrospective effect, from April 03, 1997. Due to this, teachers became entitled to Gratuity from their employer w.e.f. April 3rd, 1997.

The Counsel for the petitioner argued that part-time teachers cannot be restricted from the benefit of the scheme. The Act does not does not create a distinction between full time employee or part time employee. The Counsel relied on the judgement in National Bal Bhawan v. Vandana wherein it was held that even part-time employees are eligible for gratuity under the Act.

The Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, argued that the petitioner’s appointment was temporary and that their service was liable to be terminated at any time. Moreover, their service was renewed every year for continuation of service and wages being paid from contingency fund. The payment was also decided on the basis of the actual periods taught.

The Court held that the ‘teacher’ is included in the definition of ‘employee’ under Section 2(e) of the Act. For this reason a ‘teacher’ is entitled to gratuity. The Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal filed by the Birla Institute of Technology, in favour of the teacher. It held that “…the teachers were held entitled to claim the amount of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act from their employer with effect from 03.04.1997

The Court also took notice of the definition of ‘wages’ in Section 2(s) of the Act. In National Bal Bhawan case, it was also held that “An employee is an employee, whether on casual, ad-hoc or part time basis. The definition of employee in the Act, 1972 also does not speak of any specific categories of the employees for its applicability, be it, regular, adhoc, part time, casual etc.

The quantum of the gratuity to be paid was also decided upon by the Court in the abovementioned case as “The combined reading of sub-Section (e) and subSection (s) of Section 2 of the Act, 1972 leaves no doubt that the gratuity is payable to the employees defined under the subject Act and is to be assessed on the basis of the wages / emoluments, within the ceiling limit as provided there-under

The Court, relying on the abovementioned judgement, allowed the petition.

Kerala High Court held that enmity cannot be a ground to discard Witness’ evidence

The High Court of Kerala dismissed the appeal of a person convicted of murder, rejecting the arguments of the counsel that the witness cannot be relied upon since there is personal enmity between the accused and the witness and that makes the evidence unreliable.

The facts of the case were that the accused’s wife left him to live with another relative of hers. She was having a sexual relationship with the relative. The wife and the relative were sleeping on the roof of their house when the accused came to the roof and killed the deceased with a hammer. Afterwards he ran away. The mother of the deceased as well as other relatives were present inside the house and came out once they realized something was wrong.

The wife as well as the relatives became witness against the accused. The Sessions Court had found the accused guilty. Appeal was therefore filed before the Kerala High Court. The Counsel for the accused objected to the witnesses and evidence for multiple discrepancies. The Counsel stated that the statement of wife should not be relied on since she had enmity towards the accused. The statement of another witness changed after the initial submission. Moreover, they argued that the roof was slanted so nobody could sleep there and a newlywed couple would not sleep in the open on the roof.

The Court rejected the arguments of the Counsel since the slant of roof was only slight and arguments of privacy for a newlywed couple was subjective and could not be a valid argument. On the issue of change in the statement of a witness, the Court rejected the claim. Stating that “But the question that emerges is whether such exaggeration or embellishment (if it is treated so) makes the evidence of PW2 unreliable. In our view, merely because of the reason that there is some exaggeration or embellishment in the deposition of the witness, from that stated to the police, cannot be a reason to discard the entire evidence unless it is so contradictory as to disprove the material aspects spoken of by the witness.”

The Court relied on State of U.P v Anil Singh for this conclusion. On the issue of the wife not being a reliable witness the court relying on the judgment in Mohabbat and others v State of M.P and Anil Rai v State of Bihar held that “It is a well settled position of law that, merely because, the witness is a close relative to the victim, evidence of such witness cannot be discarded, treating it as an interested version.

The matter was thereby dismissed.

Suo Moto by the Supreme Court in the Covid Case

Monday, 31st May, 2021 the Supreme Court questioned the center regarding the dual pricing and procurement policies in the Covid Vaccine, the centers diversion from the National Immunisation Program and its mandate on of registrations on the COWIN app.

The three judge Bench consisted of Justices D. Y. Chandrachud, L. Nageswara Rao and Ravindra Bhat. Solicitor General, Tushar Mehta, advanced that there had been some developments regarding the vaccination front and in his affidavit, he would elaborate and mention the facts for the same.

Justices D. Y. Chandrachud mentioned that his concern was regarding the basis of the central governments plan where they have stated that people above the age of 45 would receive vaccinations free of charge whereas population below 45 the state will have their arrangements with the manufactures and the remaining 50% procurement would be done by private hospitals. The centre has all by itself derived at the conclusion that the population which has crossed the age of 45 has a higher mortality rate than the ones below 45 however they have not considered the fact that the second wave has affected the people below 45 equally. The judge’squestion was why had the centre not made proper arrangements for people below the age of 45 and relied upon the state for the same. He asked for a justification for the same. To this the SG expressed that since 1st May provisions for below 45 people are also being done by the centre. For the people ranging between 18-45 50% of the vaccination would be on pro rata basis where as the other half would be given to private sectors. He also added that the question of bargaining with the manufactures is also irradicated as the prices will be fixed by the central government.

Justice Roa in view of one theory stated that the central government should make policies in such a way that vulnerable sections, like people will illnesses of health conditions and also falling in the range of 18-45 years receive the vaccination first.  To this justice Chandrachud added that vaccination for this range given through private hospitals is received by urban areas and some small towns but the rural areas have been neglected.

There were questions raised by the judges regarding the pricing of the vaccines by stating that the centre and the state have to fix a price for the vaccine for all age groups and there can be no difference in the pricing for people above or below 45.  The judges stated that they cannot ask the government to change the policy all together but they insisted that the new policy should meet tests of reasonableness.

Agreement without Consideration (S.25)

Usually without consideration a contract is not valid, but there are exceptions too.

These are the exceptions:

1. Case of natural love and affection: (S.25(1)) If an agreement is made without consideration, it can be valid if

a. Parties are very closely related

b. Due to love and affection

c. Registered

d. In writing

Example: (Venkataswamy Vs Rangaswamy) In love and affection the elder brother, promised to clear the debts of his younger brother. The agreement was in writing and it was registered. It was held by the court that the elder one was liable to the creditors.

2. Past voluntary service: (S.25(2)) A promise to compensate wholly or in part a person who has already voluntarily done some thing for the promisor is enforceable. In other words a promise to pay for a past voluntary service is binding.

Example: A finds B’s book and gives it to her and B promises to pay A Rs. 100. In so doing, there is a valid contract in such cases, although A’s act was voluntary.

3. Payment of a time-barred debt: (S.25(3)) A promise to pay a time barred debt is enforceable. The promise should be in writing. It should be signed by the promisor or by his agent generally or specially authorized in that behalf. The promise may be to pay the whole or any part of the debt. The debt must be such of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits. As per Balkrishna v. Jayshankar, promise to pay time barred debt has to be an express promise to pay, and not merely an implied promise.

4. Gift actually made: (S.25 Explanation 1) For validity of a gift, which is not an agreement, does not require a consideration. The provision as to consideration does not affect, as between donor and the donee, the validity of any gift which has actually been made.