Design a site like this with
Get started

Delhi Development Authority v D.C. Sharma

Appeal No. 205 of 2010

Facts Of The Case

There was an ad published by the petitioner (Delhi Development Authority/DDA) under the Expandable Housing Scheme in 1996. The respondent (DC Sharma) paid a sum of Rs. 15,000 according to the terms and conditions of the scheme as published by the petitioner. The respondent was allotted a flat in Narela, Delhi, and was communicated through a letter. All the details of the flat regarding the amount was mentioned in the letter. Again, the respondent submitted another Rs. 15,000 as the confirmation money to the petitioner. The respondent informed the petitioner via a letter saying he has changed his residential address and all official communication must be done via the new mentioned address. He also added that the respondent is a government servant, and to secure a loan from his department he needs the official mortgage permission. Later on, even after visiting the office of the petitioner, no communication was made to the respondent. The respondent filed an RTI to seek information regarding the same. After this preliminary inquiry, the respondent received a letter from the petitioner saying that the flat was allotted to someone else over time. The respondent aggrieved by the letter filed a consumer complaint under the District Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum, New Delhi.


  1. Whether the act was done by DDA, a statutory authority was against public interest or not?
  2. Whether the respondent deserves hefty compensation from the petitioner for harassing him for more than 18 years or not?


The Hon’ble court held the petitioner is liable for unfair trade practices and causing impalpable harassment of the respondent and imposed punitive damage amounting to Rs. 5,00,000/- on the petitioner and other amounts. The court considered that the petitioner’s claim is baseless and is trying to distract the court from the misdemeanor of the authorities. It is a way of covering up the negligence of public officials tormenting the respondent for over ten years. The act commissioned by DDA was against the public at large and hence the damages incurred should be taken from the pockets of dishonest officials who are taking advantage of this “meritless litigation”. The appeals of DDA were dismissed and the impugned order of state commission was upheld.


This case embarks upon the importance of Section 21 of the Right to Information Act. The Hon’ble court saw through the delinquencies of the statutory department and provided relief to the aggrieved party. The public officials are supposed to help the aggrieved party and not take advantage of them by performing negligent acts at cost of the general public.

Manjit Singh Dhaliwal and Ors v. JVPD Properties Pvt. Ltd

Brief facts:- The case arises out of 15 complainants assailing a common order recorded by the Ld. Member & Adjudicating Officer, MahaRERA, which was rejected on the ground of lack of Agreement for Sale with regards to residential flats to be built by the respondent(promoter). All 15 of the allottees, based on identical Letters of Allotment, had paid 50% of the payment amount to the promoter. No work had been started in relation to the project, and as per email communications made by the promoter to some of the allottees, the promoter had no wish to continue the project. This gave rise to the controversy at hand. Issues:- The main issues within the case were:

1. Whether the lack of an Agreement for Sale was enough to fail a complaint.

2. Whether the Letters of Allotment could be treated as Agreements for Sale.

Judgment:-The Court decided that the lack of Agreement for Sale could not fail the complaints, and hence the 15 appeals of the allottees were allowed. The common order dated 29th December, 2017 was set aside. The matter was further remanded to the Ld. Adjudicating Officer, MahaRERA to be decided afresh on merits.  The Respondent was ordered to pay cost of Rs. 15000/- to each of the allottee/appellant within 30 days from the date of judgment. The parties to the appeal/to the original complaint were directed to appear before the Ld. Member and Adjudicating Officer on 23rd April, 2018. 

Ratio The Court held that mere lack of an Agreement for Sale will not be enough to fail the complaint. Opining on Section 15(1)(a) of RERA, the Court stated that the term “Agreement for Sale” mentioned therein could not be the subject of strict uses of terminology, on account of the phrase “or as the case may be” used within the same. This phrase itself indicates the presence of more than one alternative scenario. The present case thus serves as an appropriate example for the same. Further, Section 2(c) of RERA states that an Agreement for Sale is one between the promoter and allottee. The present Letters of Allotment stipulate a description of the property to be purchased by individual allottees, a description of the payment schedule and the total cost, the necessary requisition of permissions, obligation to complete the projects, and getting clarity to the title. Pairing the same with Section 2(d) of RERA which contemplates the definition of an allottee, the Court observed that an agreement is basically the meeting of minds, even sans the legal obligations. The Letters of Allotment are incidentally couched in such a fashion so as to incorporate all requisite terms of a valid agreement, i.e. the offer, acceptance, consideration, time schedule, clarity of title, etc.Therefore, in the present case, nothing was left to be negotiated and settled for future. Terms were agreed and Letters of Allotment were read and understood. It was a certain and a concluded bargain. Hence, the Court held that a concluded contract had come into existence. Thus, looking into Section 18(1)(a) of RERA the Court came to the conclusion that based on its discussion, the case fell into the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Officer, MahaRERA.

Ramki vs The State of Tamil Nadu

Judgement Date– 29.04.2014

Division Bench– The Honourable Mr. Justice V. Dhanapalan& the Honourable Mr Justice G. Chockalingam

Grounds of Case– Sections 4(1) (aaa), 4(1-A), 4(1)(H) of Tamil Nadu Prevention Act r/w 7, 13 & 14 of RS Rules, 2000 offence regarding Bootleggers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Forest Offenders, Sand Offenders, Drug Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act (14 of 1982), Section 3 and 420, 468, 471, 473, 475 Indian Penal Code, i.e., offences related to Cheating, Forgery, and counterfeits.

Fact-The writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, which provides power to the High Court for issuance of the writ; the petition prayed for the issue of Habeas Corpus (to present the body against illegal detention). The petition argued on various grounds to set aside the order of detention. The court’s primary focus was derived on illegible document of the screen record of vehicle provided to Dentu (the petitioner), which deprived Dentu to comply with the orders of the court. It has appeared that the respondent (the union) consists of the documents that the appellant requested to transfer. The copies which were supplied were not readable. Meanwhile, they weren’t furnished with the vernacular translated version of the said report. The petitioner also referred to the case of Manjit Singh Grewal @ Gogi vs Union of India and others reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 59 and prayed that the said act of detaining authority is against the judgement of the Supreme court in the above-mentioned case reference.

Judgement-The court judgement was in favour of the petitioner. By quashing down the detention of the petitioner, the court referred few statements those are-1. It is obligatory to the detaining authority to provide the translated version of the report in the language known by the accused.2. The facts show that the protection provided under the constitution have not been followed.3. Hence, the court quashed the detention and allowed the writ of habeas corpus.4. The petitioner is set at liberty unless custardy is required.



APPELLANT: Riju Prasad Sarma

RESPONDENT: State of Assam and Ors.CITATION: (2015) 42 SCD 764

BENCH: Justice Fakkir Mohamed Kalifulla, Justice Shiva Kirti Singh

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:The plea of the petitioner was that certain fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution are guaranteed only against State action, and not against private customs or practices. It was contended that the Judiciary is as much a part of State as the Executive and the Legislature and therefore, it cannot permit the continuation of discrimination in violation of Article 14. The writ petition was filed challenging the election of Dolois (head priest of the temple). The only ground stated on behalf of the petitioners was a rebuttal of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution, while the respondents argued that for Part III of the Constitution, Article 12 denotes the term “the State” to include the Government, Parliament of India, Government and legislature of the Statesalso, but it has left out the Judiciary. So, the Judiciary cannot be included and treated as ‘the State’ when it performs judicial functions in contraposition to administrative powers.

ISSUE:Whether judicial decisions by the Judiciary can be included in the State’s action in case of issuance of writs?

HELD:The Court held that if the Judiciary in India function on its judicial side cannot be considered as a State under Article 12 of the Constitution. However, when the Courts deal with their employees or perform in other matters exclusively in an administrative role, they may fall within the definition of the State, for alluring writ jurisdiction. The Court also decreed that writs against the Judiciary would stand against their administrative actions only.It was also observed that the judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court cannot be subjected to writ jurisdiction and for want of requisite governmental control, Judiciary cannot be considered as State under Article 12. A contextual interpretation must be preferred as it shall promote justice, especially through equitable adjudication in the protection of Fundamental Rights covered by Part III of the Constitution.

S.R. Batra And Anr. v. Smt. Taruna Batra (2006)

FACTS:- The Respondent, Taruna Batra married Amit Batra on 14th April 2000. After their marriage, the Respondent started living with her husband in the house of Appellant no. 2 (Amit Batra’smother). Amit Batra filed a divorce petition against the Respondent and the Respondent countered by filing a First Investigation Report (FIR) under Section 406, 498A, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Respondent’s father-in-law, Appellant no. 2 (mother-in-law), sister-in-law were arrested by the police and were granted bail after 3 days. Respondent moved to her parent’s residence due to the divorce dispute with her husband.In the present dispute, the Respondent alleged that when she tried to enter the house of Appellant no. 2 the main entrance was locked. So, she filed a suit for a mandatory injunction so that she can enter the house of Appellant no. 2, which was also the house she stayed at after her marriage. The appellants in defence stated that the Respondent along with her parents forcibly broke open the locks of Appellant no. 2’s house and that terrorized them, so for some time, they stayed in their office. The Appellants also stated that Amit Batra had shifted to his own flat before the litigation between the parties had started.


● Whether the Respondent has any rights against the Appellant no. 2’s house?

● Whether the Appellant no. 2’s house is a ‘shared household’?

● Whether the Respondent can claim for an alternative accommodation against the Appellants?

JUDGEMENT & ANALYSIS:- The Supreme Court of India pronounced its judgement on 15thDecember 2006. The court held that the wife has rights only against her husband and not against her father-in-law or mother-in-law. In this case, the house in questions belongs to Appellant no. 2, who is the mother-in-law of the Respondent and not her husband, therefore, she has no rights over that house. Further, the Respondent cannot claim a mandatory injunction against the Appellants because she was not in possession of Appellant no. 2’s house as she moved to her parents’ house.Appellant no. 2’s house cannot be a ‘shared household’ of the Respondent, therefore she cannot claim a right to residence in the household in questions because the household in question neither belongs to her husband, nor was taken on rent by her husband, nor belongs to the joint family of which the husband if a family member, rather it is an exclusive property under the name of Appellant no. 2 who is the mother-in-law of the Respondent. The claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the in-laws or other relatives. The Appellants being the in-laws of the Respondent, she cannot claim an alternative accommodation.

CONCLUSION:- The Supreme Court of India allowed the appeal of the Appellants, set aside the impugned judgement of the High Court of Delhi and the order of Senior Civil Judge, finally dismissing the injunction application of the Respondent.

Union of India v Sriharan and ors (writ petition no. 48 of 2014)

LifeSentence andRemissionFactual Background:The petitioner has challenged a letter issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu to the Secretary, Government of India wherein the state of Tamil Nadu proposed to set aside the sentence of life imprisonment and to release the respondents convicted in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. The respondents were originally imposed with a death sentence but the same court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. The issued letter by the state govt. of Tamil Nadu resulted in this writ petition.


(i) Whether imprisonment for life under S.53 read with S.45 of the IPC meant imprisonment for the rest of the life of the prisoner or a convict undergoing life imprisonment has a right to claim remission and whether the principles enunciated in Swamy Shraddananda, a special category of a sentence may be made for the very few cases where the death the penalty might be reduced by the punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term above fourteen years and to put that category beyond application of remission?

(ii) Whether the “Appropriate Government” is permitted to exercise the power of remission under S.432/433 of the Code after the parallel power has been exercised by the President under Art.72 or the Governor under Art.161 or by this Court in its Constitutional power under Art.32 as in this case?

(iii) Whether S. 432(7) of the Code gives primacy to the executive power of the Union and excludes the executive power of the State where the power of Union is co-extensive?

(iv) Whether the Union or the State has primacy over the subject matter enlisted in List III of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India for the exercise of the power of remission?

(v) Whether there can be two appropriate Governments in a given case under S. 432(7) of the Code?

(vi) Whether suomoto exercise of the power of remission under S. 431(1) is permissible in the scheme of the section, if yes, whether the procedure prescribed in sub-clause (2) of the same Section is mandatory or not?

(vii) Whether the term “consultation” stipulated in S. 435(1) of the Code implies “concurrence”?

Reasoning and discussion:As for the first issue, the SC opined that imprisonment for life according to S.53 and S.45 of IPC means imprisonment for the rest of life of the prisoner subject to the right to claim remission, and such remission power is exercisable by the President and Governor of the state provided under Art. 72 and 161 of Indian Constitution; as also provided under S.432 of CrPC. The court holds the decision of Swamy Shraddananda‘s case as a special category of sentence, death penalty reduced to life imprisonment which is beyond the application of remission. Secondly, the court observed that S. 432 and S. 433 of the CrPC provide power to the appropriate government to suspend or grant remission, and not to the court. The decision-making power is always imposed upon the appropriate government even if the power was exercised earlier by the Governor or President under Art.161 or by the Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Thirdly, the court analyzed the status of appropriate government; when the order of a sentence passed by the Criminal Court under any law which falls within the provision of Art.73(1)(a) of the Constitution, the appropriate government would be the central government for exercising its power of remission, suspension and commutation under S.432 and S. 433 of CrPC even if the legislature of the state is also entitled to make a law on the same subject. However, when the offender is sentenced within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned state, the state govt. would be the appropriate govt. Fourthly, the court ruled that suomoto power of remission cannot be exercised by the appropriate govt. under S.432 of the Code, it has to be initiated by the convicted person under S.432(2). The order of suspension or remission should be guided by the opinion to be rendered by the presiding officer of the Court concerned and following provision S.432(2) is mandatory. Finally, the court denotes that any situations under the sub-clauses (a) to (c) of S.435(1) fall within the jurisdiction of central govt., which is important in the process of “consultation” as a requirement of “concurrence”.

Decision:The SC held that the Tamil Nadu govt. cannot use statutory powers of remission to release the convicts of Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination without the concurrence of the central govt. As the investigation was carried by the central agency i.e. CBI, the Central Govt. will decide on the remission according to S.435 of CrPC; the Tamil Nadu govt was required to consult with the Central Govt. However, the state govt. certainly can use the power under Art.161 to commute their sentence on the grounds that there has been a change in the situation and there is a rejection of mercy petition by the Governor which was no longer relevant.

Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences v Prasanth S. Dhananka & Ors

Civil Appeal No. 4119 of 1999Facts:- The respondent (Prasanth Dhananka) was admitted to the appellant hospital (NIMS) because he had a tumor in his chest. The staff without consulting a specialist performed surgery removing the tumor damaging neurological blood vessels, paralyzing the respondent. He then filed a complaint before NCDRC claiming medical negligence on the part of the doctors and claimed compensation. The commission awarded fifteen lacs compensation to the respondent. Both the parties appeared in the Supreme Court, one claiming that the compensation was not enough and the other party stating that the consent of the patient was taken and hence they are not liable to pay the compensation 


  1. Whether the consent of the patient will dissolve the liability of the doctors in medical negligence or not?
  2. Whether the compensation awarded in the case was sufficient or not?

Judgment:- The Hon’ble Court after examining all the evidence and acknowledging Several Global establishments in medicine awarded an exemplary compensation of one crore rupees to the respondent for all the torment he and his family had undergone as it was medical negligence on behalf of the hospital. The consent as argued by the appellant that is given by the patient for the biopsy cannot (except in few cases) be levied as consent for the surgery. The court stated that “the ‘adequate compensation’ that we speak of, must to some extent, be a rule of the thumb measure, and as a balance has to be struck, it would be difficult to satisfy all the parties concerned.”The Hon’ble Court also laid down a few guidelines concerning the compensation awarded in cases of medical negligence: 

  1. Medical negligence and error or misjudgment in medical treatment are not similar.
  2. If the standard of care is present, then it is not medical negligence.
  3. A balance is made between the compensation demanded by the aggrieved party and claims made by the opposite party. Sympathy for the victim should not blindside the court in awarding the compensation.
  4. The compensation should be reasonable to provide a means of survival for the victim.

Conclusion:- The Hon’ble court by awarding an exemplary compensation, the highest-ever awarded in the cases of medical negligence set a precedent for future cases. The court has set up guidelines for the assessment of the compensation not motivated by compassion or empathy but reasonable discretion of the court. 

PandurangGanpatiChaugule v. VishwasraoPatilMurgudSahakari Bank LTD

FACTS:A notification was issued in 2003 which brought the Co-operative bank within the class of banks entitled to seek recourse under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. Section 2(1)(c)(iv) was inserted into the SARFAESI Act. Before that, the Co-operative bank and the Multi-StateCo-operative bank took recourse to the SARFAESI Act under the notification issued in 2003. Writ petitions were filed questioning vires of the notification issued under Section 2(1)(c)(v) of the SARFAESI Act and the insertion of Section 2(1)(c)(iv) to the SARFAESI Act in 2013. A Writ Petition was by the Appellant filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India questioning the invocation of the SARFAESI Act by issuing notices under Section 13 by Co-operative banks and questioning the Respondent’s actions under SARFAESI.During the pendency of the matters, the Central Government brought into force the Enforcement of Security Deposit and Debts Law (Amendment) Act, 2012 amending the definition of Section 2(1)(c) of the SARFAESI Act, the amendment has also been questioned in the writ petition filed in this Court.

ISSUES IDENTIFIED: ● What is the scope of the power of the Parliament to legislate under Entry 45 of List I viz. ‘Banking’ and Entry 32 of List II of the Schedule VII of the Constitution of India?

● Whether the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) applies to the Co-operative banks?

● Whether the definition of ‘banking company’ contained in Section 5(c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (BR Act) covers co-operative banks registered under the State law and also Multi-StateCo-operative societies under the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (MSCS Act)?

● Whether co-operative banks at State and Multi-State level are Co-operative banks within the purview of the SARFAESI Act?

JUDGEMENT & ANALYSIS:The Court held that “The provisions of The Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDB Act), by invoking the doctrine of incorporation do not apply to the recovery of dues by Co-operative banks from their members. The field of Co-operative societies cannot be said to have been covered by the Central legislation by reference to Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Co-operative banks constituted under the Co-operative Societies Acts enacted by the respective States would be covered by ‘Co-operative societies’ by Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. The basis on which the decisions have been reached related to the scope of the legislative fields covered by Entry 45 of List I and Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule which question undoubtedly touches upon the issue in hand. As the decisions conflict are of coordinate Benches the reference, in our considered view, ought to have been made to a larger Bench.

CONCLUSION:Finally, the Supreme Court of India directed the Bombay Registry to place the papers before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for being referred to a larger Bench.

Rajnesh vs Neha and Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 730 of 2020

Facts: This present criminal appeal arises out of Interim Maintenance Petition filed u/s 125 Cr.P.C. by the respondent wife Neha. The wife left her matrimonial home in January 2013 after the birth of the son who is also a respondent in this appeal. She has filed an application for interim maintenance on behalf of herself and her minor son. The family court gave an order that an interim maintenance of Rs. 15,000/- will be given to the RespondentNo.1 i.e. the wife, per month from 01.09.2013, and Rs. 5,000 permonth will be given as interim maintenance to the Respondent No. 2 i.e. the son from 01.09.2013 to 31.08.2015; and that the amount will exceed to Rs. 10,000 per month from 01.09.2015 onwards. A writ against the mentioned order of Nagpur Family Court, was filed in Bombay High Court. The High Court dismissed the petition. Later the matter was presented in the Apex Court.


a) Overlapping jurisdiction

b) Payment of Interim Maintenance

c) Criteria for determining quantum of maintenance

d) Date from which maintenance will be awarded

e) Enforcement of orders of maintenance

Judgment:The Supreme Court in the present case has framed guidelines on overlapping jurisdiction under different statutes for the payment of maintenance, payment of Interim Maintenance, to decide on the criteria for determining the quantum of maintenance and to give a verdict on the date from which maintenance is to be awarded, and enforcement of orders of maintenance. The Court while considering the above-mentioned issues, noticed that no party can be barred from approaching the court under one or more statutes as each and every Act is unique and independent in its own way. However, parallel operation of these acts would lead to multiplicity of proceedings hindering the courts in taking up other important cases. This would also cause contradictory orders. Hence, the court directed that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant shall disclose all the previous maintenance proceedings, and the orders passed therein, so that the Court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. For the payment of interim maintenance, the court has ordered that the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities shall be filed by both parties in all maintenance proceedings, including pending proceedings before the concerned Family Court / District Court / Magistrate Court, as the case may be, throughout the country. The court also gave guidelines on which the quantum of maintenance will be decided which includes status of living, financial capacity, termination of the relationship, if the wife is working and the expenses a father needs to cover for his child. The court also stated that in order to prevent a dependent from being reduced to destitution and vagrancy, it is necessary that maintenance be awarded from the date on which the application for maintenance is filed before the concerned Court.It is justly acknowledged by this latest landmark judgment that, “Maintenance laws have been enacted as a measure of social justice to provide recourse to dependent wives and children for their financial support, so as to prevent them from falling into destitution and vagrancy.” Thus at any cost, no person can deny paying the maintenance. 

Karnataka Power Transmission Corp v Ashok Iron Works Private Ltd.

Civil Appeal no. 1879 of 2003


The respondent (Ashok Works Pvt Ltd) applied to the appellant (Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation or KPTC) for the supply of electricity. The KPTC failed to comply and the respondent filed a complaint with Karnataka high court. Later agreeing to the court order the respondent paid extra monetary demand but the KPTC failed to supply the electricity. The respondent filed a consumer complaint claiming damages but the KPTC argued that it is a commercial unit and not a consumer and hence the claim is invalid. The district court ordered in favor of the appellant but the Ashok works appealed to the state commission that held the complaint valid stating that the respondent is a consumer. The KTPC appealed in the supreme court of India arguing on two factors:


  • Whether Ashok works, a private company is a consumer under section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act or not? and a person under Section 2(1)(m)
  • Whether the dispute between both the parties comes under the ambit of Service as defined under section 2(1)(o) of the same act or not?


The court held that the term “person” in the act is not restrictive but it is exhaustively interpreted as “including them”. The provision hence is inclusive and not exclusive. The court stated that the legislature deliberated not to exclude a juristic person like a company, it should involve both corporate and incorporated companies. It was held that a private company is within the meaning of section 2(1)(d) read with Section 2(1)(m).

The court differentiated that ‘supply of electricity’ is not a sale under section 2(1)(d) but is a form of service under section 2(1)(o). So KTPC not supplying the electricity constitutes deficiency of services and compensation claimed by the respondent is valid.


The Hon’ble court interpreted the terms “person” and “service” to provide justice to the company. Private companies can now fall under the definition of a “person” under the act. This interpretation enables companies to file a complaint under The Consumer Protection Act and claim damages for the deficiency of services.